000			03385cam a2200325 a 4500
001			16107526
005			20141021121451.0
008			100225s2010 maua b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2010008279
015			_aGBB078050 _2bnb
016	7		_a015588810 _2Uk
020			_a9780262014656 (hardcover : alk. paper)
020			_a0262014653 (hardcover : alk. paper)
035			_a(OCoLC)ocn531718960
040			_aDLC _cDLC _dYDXCP _dUKM _dC#P _dBWX _dCDX _dUPM _dDLC
043			_ae-ru---
050	0	0	_aHC340.12 _b.G54 2010
082	0	0	_a330.947/0861 _222
100	1		_aGilman, Martin G.
245	1	0	_aNo precedent, no plan : _binside Russia's 1998 default / _cMartin Gilman.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. : _bMIT Press, _cc2010.
300			_axx, 331 p. : _bill. ; _c24 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [311]-320) and index.
505	0		_aRussia and the IMF -- Growing IMF involvement -- Russia seems to be turning a corner -- Hope disappointed -- How a possible crisis becomes probable -- How a probable crisis then becomes unavoidable -- The surprising postcrisis recovery -- The friendly divorce -- The legacy of the crisis -- History is not doomed to repeat itself.
520	1		_a"In 1998, President Boris Yeltsin's government defaulted on its domestic debt and Russia experienced a financial meltdown that brought it to the brink of disaster. In No Precedent, No plan, Martin Gilman offers an insider's view of Russia's financial crisis. As the International Monetary Fund's senior person in Moscow, Gilman was in the eye of the storm. Russia's policy response to the economic collapse stemming from the disintegration of the Soviet Union was chaotic. Fiscal deficits loomed in anticipation of future budget revenue that never seemed to materialize---despite repeated promises to the IMF. The rapid buildup of sovereign debt would have challenged even a competent government. In the new Russia, with its barely functioning government and no consensus on the path toward democratic and economic transformation, domestic politics trumped economic common sense." "Gilman argues that the debt default, although avoidable, actually spurred Russia to integrate its economy with the rest of the world. In analyzing the ordeal of the 1998 crisis, Gilman suggests that the IMF helped Russia avoid an even greater catastrophe. He details the IMF's involvement and underscores the unique challenge that Russia presented to the IMF. There really was no precedent, even if economist Joseph Stiglitz and others argued otherwise. In recounting Russia's emergence from the IMF's tutelage, Gilman explains how the shell-shocked Russian public turned to Vladimir Putin in search of stability after the trauma of 1998. And although Russia's own prospects are favorable, Gilman expresses concern that the 1998 Russian default could serve as an unfortunate precedent for sovereign defaults in the future with the IMF once again playing a similar role." "No Precedent, No Plan offers a definitive account---the first from an insider's perspective---of Russia's painful transition to a market economy."--BOOK JACKET.
650		0	_aFinancial crises _zRussia (Federation) _y21st century.
651		0	_aRussia (Federation) _xEconomic conditions _y1991-
942			_2lcc _cBK
999			_c25582 _d25582